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Abstract Volitional action and self-control—feelings of act-
ing according to one’s own intentions and in being control of
one’s own actions—are fundamental aspects of human con-
scious experience. However, it is unknown whether high-level
cognitive control mechanisms are affected by socially salient
but nonconscious emotional cues. In this study, we manipu-
lated free choice decisions to act or withhold an action by
subliminally presenting emotional faces: In a novel version
of the Go/NoGo paradigm, participants made speeded
button-press responses to Go targets, withheld responses to
NoGo targets, and made spontaneous, free choices to execute
or withhold the response for Choice targets. Before each tar-
get, we presented emotional faces, backwards masked to ren-
der them nonconscious. In Intentional trials, subliminal angry
faces made participants more likely to voluntarily withhold
the action, whereas fearful and happy faces had no effects.
In a second experiment, the faces were made supraliminal,
which eliminated the effects of angry faces on volitional
choices. A third experiment measured neural correlates of
the effects of subliminal angry faces on intentional choice
using EEG. After replicating the behavioural results found in
Experiment 1, we identified a frontal-midline theta compo-
nent—associated with cognitive control processes—which is
present for volitional decisions, and is modulated by sublim-
inal angry faces. This suggests a mechanism whereby sublim-
inally presented Bthreat^ stimuli affect conscious control pro-
cesses. In summary, nonconscious perception of angry faces
increases choices to inhibit, and subliminal influences on vo-
litional action are deep seated and ecologically embedded.
Keywords Cognitive control . Decision-making . Emotion .
ERP . Priming
Healthy adult individuals experience volitional control over
many of their actions. This notion is fundamental to most
conceptions of morality and responsibility. Voluntary control
allows the individual to implement reasoned and flexible goal-
oriented action rather than being constantly enslaved by auto-
matic responses to the external environment (Shadlen &Gold,
2004). While volitional production of actions has been long
studied (e.g., Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983), not
much attention has been given to volitional self-control and
the role of inhibition in volition (but see Filevich, Kühn, &
Haggard, 2012; Parkinson & Haggard, 2014, 2015).
Some forms of self-control can be considered tonic—or
long lasting—such as refraining from a substance of abuse.
This is often colloquially referred to as Bwillpower^
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998;
Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). Other forms focus on more
immediate and transient moments of self-control—the notion
of Bstopping oneself from doing something at the last
moment^—which we call intentional inhibition (Filevich
et al., 2012; Parkinson & Haggard, 2014). As an everyday
example, consider refraining from shouting at a loved one
whilst in anger. Experimentally we define this as endogenously
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cancelling a currently planned action that has a strong associat-
ed urge or prepotency. This can be considered a form of voli-
tional cognitive inhibitory control as the ability to choose to
cancel an (possibly unhelpful) urge allows for more flexible
cognition and behaviour (Diamond, 2013), demonstrating what
Shadlen refers to as Bfreedom from immediacy^ (Shadlen &
Gold, 2004).
It has been argued that such moments of volitional self-
control constitute high-level and effortful cognitive control
processes that are intimately linked to conscious awareness
(Dehaene et al., 2003; Hommel, 2007; Mayr, 2004). On these
views, to consciously resist a prepotent action one should also
be conscious of the urge to act, of the need to inhibit it, and
subsequently of the volitional decision to do so. However,
several studies have demonstrated nonconscious manipulation
of motor-control processes via subliminal priming (e.g., van
Gaal, Lamme, Fahrenfort, & Ridderinkhof, 2011; van Gaal,
Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & Lamme, 2009).
However, these studies focused on exogenously (stimulus-
elicited) inhibition, leaving open the question of whether there
are nonconscious effects on volitional, endogenously generat-
ed intentional inhibition.
In a previous study, Parkinson and Haggard (2014) uncov-
ered initial evidence that nonconscious information can influ-
ence supposedly Bfree^ volitional decisions to act or inhibit. In
a modified Go/NoGo task, participants prepared a unimanual
button press and watched for visual targets (arrows).
Commonly presented Reactive Go targets elicited speeded
responses. Rare Reactive NoGo targets indicated that partici-
pants must inhibit the prepared response. Critically, a third set
of Intentional Go trials required participants to make quick,
spontaneous decisions whether to execute the button press or
not (Intentional Go/NoGo). Thus, over the course of the ex-
periment participants made both Intentional Go and NoGo
responses, alongside their Reactive counterparts.
Prior to each target, arrow prime stimuli were presented
subliminally using backwards masking. Some subliminal
primes facilitated Reactive Go responses, indicated by speed-
ed response times, whereas other primes were inhibitory,
slowing Reactive Go responses. The key finding was that
Intentional responses were affected by subliminal priming.
As with Reactive Go responses, facilitatory primes speeded
Intentional actions, whereas inhibitory primes slowed them.
Subliminal primes also influenced the actual volitional choice
participants made in Intentional Go trials: Following facilita-
tory primes, individuals were more likely to make the voli-
tional decision to press the button, while inhibitory primes
made themmore likely to choose to withhold. Thus, this study
showed that simple volitional decisions to withhold or execute
an action could be manipulated by nonconscious means.
An important limitation in Parkinson and Haggard’s (2014)
study is that the observed subliminal priming effects were
based on arbitrary stimulus-response mappings between target
and response, and the effects of the subliminal primes on
intentional inhibition can be attributed simply to visual con-
gruency between prime and target stimuli, facilitating or
inhibiting the appropriate response choice at a motor level
(Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003). Thus, the mechanism under-
lying Parkinson and Haggard’s (2014) effect may not lie at a
high cognitive level, nor would this manipulation occur out-
side the realms of this specific experiment and stimulus set.
This leaves open the important question of whether volitional
self-control can be manipulated by ecologically valid and so-
cially relevant stimuli (i.e., emotional human faces) for which
salience for volition cannot be accounted for in terms of low-
level properties of congruence or in congruence.
In this study we addressed the above question over the
course of three experiments, using emotional human faces as
stimuli. In Experiment 1 we adapted the Go/NoGo/Choose
paradigm using coloured circles as target stimuli: green for
Reactive Go, red for Reactive NoGo and yellow for
Intentional Choice. Prior to each target, a subliminal emotion-
al face prime—angry, happy, fearful, or neutral—was present-
ed for a short duration (20 ms) and backwards masked using a
scrambled face image (see Fig. 1). We examined the effects of
subliminal emotional faces on volitional decisions made on
Intentional Choice trials, and on response times. The sublim-
inal nature of emotional face primes was verified by measur-
ing d’ in a short face present/absent detection task.
In Experiment 2, we used the same paradigm, but with
increased presentation duration of the faces (100 ms) to inves-
tigate the effects of consciously perceived (supraliminal) emo-
tional faces on volitional decisions.
Finally, in Experiment 3, we further investigated the effects
of subliminal emotional faces (in this case, specifically anger
compared to neutral only) on volitional self-control using
electroencephalography (EEG). Specifically, we focused on
two EEG correlates of self-control. The first is the negative
going event-related potential (ERP) component known as the
N2, known as an index of reactive stopping (e.g., in a typical
Go/NoGo task; Pfefferbaum, Ford, Weller, & Kopell, 1985),
but which has also recently been linked to volitional decisions
to execute or inhibit an action (Parkinson & Haggard, 2015).
The second is frontal-midline theta (FM-θ) power, measuring
oscillatory EEG activity in the 4–7 Hz range that has been
interpreted as a signature of cognitive control (see Cavanagh
& Frank, 2014, for a review).
We selected human faces as subliminal/supraliminal
primes for several reasons. Human faces are a privileged class
of visual stimuli, with dedicated cognitive and neurological
systems involved in processing facial identity and more tran-
sient properties of the face such as eye gaze, mouth move-
ments, and facial expression (Bruce & Young, 1986; Haxby,
Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). Facial expressions are of crucial
importance in social interactions (see Frith, 2009, for a
review): Emotional expressions allow an individual—
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intentionally or not—to communicate not only her emotional
state but also her social motives.
We reasoned that the different emotional primes would affect
volitional choices to act or inhibit in different ways. Emotionally
neutral faces were used as a baseline emotional primewithwhich
to compare the effects of other emotions. Happy faces have been
shown to elicit Bapproach^ responses, decreasing response times
when they are Go targets, and decreasing inhibitory ability (in-
creasing errors of commission) when they are NoGo targets, as
compared to sad faces (Schulz et al., 2007). We therefore pre-
dicted that subliminal happy faces would also elicit approach
responses in participants and, specifically, would increase their
volitional choices to act rather than inhibit in Choice trials.
Fearful faces have been shown to increase response times, but
not affect errors of commission in a stop-signal task (Sagaspe,
Schwartz, & Vuilleumier, 2011). This is in line with inhibitory,
withdrawal effects evoked by fearful faces (Veling, Aarts, &
Stroebe, 2011); the subjective evocation of fear is known to
suppress primary motor cortex activity (Nigg, Butler, Huang-
Pollock, & Henderson, 2002). We therefore predicted that sub-
liminal fearful faces would increase participants’ likelihood of
choosing to intentionally inhibit their actions.
The effects of perceiving angry faces are more difficult to
hypothesize. Emotional contagion (e.g., Harrison, Morgan, &
Critchley, 2010; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993) would
suggest that perceiving anger induces anger in the viewer, per-
haps leading to an increase in impulsive, approach behaviours
(e.g., Aarts et al., 2010). However, angry expressions on others
can signify hostility (Lyman & Averill, 1982; Yik, 1999),
dominance (Hess, Adams, & Kleck, 2009; Jenkins & Ball,
2000), or that social rules or expectations have been contra-
vened (Blair, 2003). Thus, perceiving an angry face could con-
vey to the viewer that she should cease her current behaviour, a
process known as response reversal (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000;
Blair,Morris, Frith, Perrett, &Dolan, 1999;Marsh, Ambady, &
Kleck, 2005). This suggests that an angry face can act as an
inhibitory cue, and rather than eliciting a mirror feeling of anger
it instead causes a complementary emotion—that of fear or
pacification. Because of these two competing accounts, we
did not hypothesize a specific direction of any effects of sub-
liminal angry faces on intentional inhibition.
In summary, Experiment 1 adapted the Go/NoGo/Choose
paradigm by presenting subliminal neutral, happy, fearful, and
angry faces to investigate how nonconscious, socially salient,
and ecologically valid stimuli affect high-level volitional de-
cisions to act or inhibit an action. Experiment 2 repeated this
paradigm except using supraliminal emotional faces.
Experiment 3 further investigated the effects from




Twelve participants took part in Experiment 1, who were re-
cruited from the University of Sussex School of Psychology
Fig. 1 Example stimulus sequences from Experiment 1. This figure
shows examples of the four emotional subliminal face primes used in
Experiment 1, represented by one example face identity. Experiment 2
used similar sequences except primes were presented for 100 ms.
Experiment 3 used same stimulus timings as Experiment 3, but only
neutral and angry faces were used as primes.
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undergraduate participant pool and volunteered in return for
course credits. Eight were female, and the mean age was
18.83 years (SD = 0.83). The University of Sussex ethics
committee approved the experimental procedures.
Stimuli and procedure
Figure 1 shows a schematic of a single trial. The experiment
was presented to the participants as a simple button-press task
during which they would respond using the index finger of
their dominant (right) hand using the keyboard space bar
(hereafter referred to as a Bbutton press^ or Bresponse^).
Each trial started with a centrally presented fixation cross,
indicating where participants should focus their eyes and that
they should prepare to make a response. The participants’
instruction was to respond to coloured circle target stimuli that
would appear at the centre of the screen.
The majority (50 %) of trials were Go trials, indicated with
green targets. In these trials, participants were instructed to
always make speeded button-press responses. If participants
did not respond within 740 ms of target onset, the screen
would flash red, indicating an error; participants were
instructed to avoid errors by responding quickly and always
preparing a response during fixation. Because of this prepara-
tion and the abundance of Go trials, the button press response
can be considered a prepotent response in this design.
Successful responses made to these targets comprised the
Reactive Go responses. Unsuccessful trials in which partici-
pants failed to make responses comprised Reactive misses.
A minority of the trials (16 %) were NoGo trials, indicated
by a red target circle. In these, participants were instructed to
withhold responses. Because of the prepotency of the button-
press response, successful NoGo trials should involve effort-
ful inhibitory processes (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Verbruggen
& Logan, 2008). Successful withholding of responses in these
trials comprised Reactive NoGo trials, and unsuccessful with-
holding (in which participants erroneously made a response)
comprised Reactive false alarms.
The remaining 34 % of the trials culminated in Choice
targets, indicated by yellow target circles. Participants were
informed that upon presentation of a Choice target, they
should make a quick, volitional decision about whether to
make the button-press response or withhold it. They were
informed, both in writing and repeated verbally by the exper-
imenter (JP) during instruction and practice, that the decision
as to whether to make or withhold a response in Choice trials
is entirely free; there was no right or wrong Banswer^ in
Choice trials; there was no reward or punishment based on
their choice in a given trial; and nothing in the experiment
changes as a result of making the choice to respond or with-
hold responses.
Participants were asked to not Bprechoose^ (i.e., think of a
possible Choice response prior to such a target occurring) but
rather to make a quick decision to press or not press only when
they saw the yellow Choice target. Participants were never-
theless encouraged to remember that they had two options to
choose from and to try to use both throughout the experiment.
Choice trials in which participants made responses comprised
Intentional Go trials; Choice trials in which participants with-
held the response comprised Intentional NoGo trials. In this
design, there are no Intentional misses or false alarms.
The crucial experimental manipulation involved the sub-
liminal presentation of emotional faces prior to target circles.
These faces displayed the emotions of happiness, sadness,
fear, anger, or were neutral in emotion (see Fig. 1). Prime faces
were presented very briefly (20-ms duration) and were for-
wards and backwards masked using Bscrambled^ face images
that rendered the intact emotional face consciously impercep-
tible. Emotional face stimuli were selected from the NimStim
Face Stimulus Set.1 Three male and three female models were
selected from the set, all of which were Caucasian. The faces
had open mouths with possibly visible teeth. The images were
rendered in greyscale, and luminance was normalised across
all images using the SHINE toolbox for MATLAB
(Willenbockel et al., 2010). The face stimuli were then placed
on the same luminance grey value used as the background for
the main experiment. Participants were not informed of the
existence of the face primes before or during the main exper-
iment, but were asked simply to focus on their responses to the
coloured circles.
Each trial started with centrally placed white fixation cross
(subtending 0.25 degrees). Fixation time was jittered between
700 ms and 1,100 ms in 100 ms steps, with this value
pseudorandomly varied across all trial conditions. Following
fixation, the masked emotional-prime stimulus was presented,
in a position randomly jittered from the central fixation point
by a maximum of ±0.5 degrees vertically and horizontally.
The target circle appeared centrally on the screen,
superimposed over the mask 60 ms after the latter’s onset.
After the end of each response period (740-ms from target
onset), the screen became blank for a fixed intertrial interval
(ITI) of 700 ms.
Scrambled mask images were created as follows: An area 1
degree by 1 degree of visual angle was selected which entirely
covered the facial features of each face stimulus. This part of
each face image was partitioned into a 12 × 12 grid. The
positions of these parts were then randomised to create a
scrambled face image. For each face stimulus, 10 instances
of a scrambled mask were created at the start of each experi-
mental run. On each trial, the premask and mask stimuli were
chosen at random from the appropriate set of scrambled faces.
1 Development of the MacBrain Face Stimulus Set was overseen by Nim
Tottenham and supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation Research Network on Early Experience and Brain Development.
Please contact Nim Tottenham at tott0006@tc.umn.edu for more information
concerning the stimulus set.
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The experiments took place in dimly lit rooms. Stimuli
were presented on a PC running MATLAB (MathWorks)
and the Psychophysics Toolbox Version 3 (Brainard, 1997;
Kleiner et al., 2007). A twenty-two-inch cathode ray tube
monitor running at 100 Hz refresh rate was used.
Participants made responses via a low latency keyboard. The
monitor was placed comfortably at eye-level, and average
viewing distance was around 60 cm.
Experiment 1 used a 4 (emotional prime) × 2 (Reactive/
Intentional) × 3 (Go/NoGo/Choice) design. The experiment
consisted of 720 trials, and lasted 35–40 minutes. For each of
the four emotional face primes conditions, 90 Go, 30 NoGo,
and 60 Choice trials were presented. Trials were split up into
18 blocks of 40 trials, lasting around 2 minutes each, with
mandatory 10-second breaks in between, after which partici-
pants manually initiated the next block. After instructions
(written and verbal) and prior to the main experiment, partic-
ipants took part in a practice session of one block (40 trials),
consisting, for each emotion prime, of five Go, one NoGo, and
four Choice trials.
Following the main experiment phase, the participants
were given a second set of instructions, which explained the
basic rationale behind the main experiment, including the
presence of the masked subliminal faces prior to each target
(the only point at which they knew faces had been presented).
An example sequence was presented pictorially as part of the
written instructions. These instructions informed them that the
Bprime^ faces were supposed to be unseen to the Bconscious
eye^, and that the purpose of the main experiment was to
investigate whether emotional faces would affect their reac-
tions to the stimuli. The instructions also informed them about
the short detection task that followed.
This detection task was designed as an objective method if
verifying that the face primes were indeed subliminal (see
Results for analysis criteria for this). Participants were present-
ed with 96 trials with the same stimulus sequence as the main
experiment, except all trials finished with a Choice target (yel-
low circle). There were 96 trials in total, four of each face
identity and emotion. In half of the trials, the emotional face
prime stimulus was present within the sequence. In the other
half, the prime stimulus was presented with a version of the
scrambled face stimulus which was different to the premask
and mask versions. Thus, in prime-absent trials, three different
scrambled faces were shown in quick succession. The order of
present/absent trials was randomised. Participants were
instructed to try to detect the presence of an intact face.
They were instructed that if they could not make a confident
decision, they shouldmake a guess response. One second after
the stimulus sequence finished, the words Present and Absent
were presented, randomly allocated to the left and right of the
screen. Participants made their response by pressing the left or
right arrow keys appropriate to their decision. Participants
were given as long as required to make the decision and were
told that response times were not an issue during the detection
task.
Analysis of behavioural data
The behavioural data from Experiment 1 were analysed using
MATLAB and Statistics Toolbox Release 2014b (The
MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA, United States) using a combi-
nation of methods. Significance testing was performed using
ANOVA and t tests. Simple effects of fearful, happy, and
angry emotional primes were calculated using neutral-
primed trials as baseline values. Bayes factors (B) were com-
puted to assess the strength of evidence for a given effect. A B
of 3 or above indicates substantial evidence for the alternative
over the null hypotheses (Jeffreys, 1939), whereas (by sym-
metry) B < 1/3 indicate substantial evidence for the null hy-
pothesis. Values of B between roughly 1/3 and 3 indicate that
the evidence is insensitive at distinguishing between the null
and alternative hypotheses (Dienes, 2014).
The Bayes factor B is the amount by which the data are
better predicted by H1 than H0. Thus, to calculate B, predicted
effects sizes for H1 are needed, as estimated from previous
research. For comparisons for which the direction of effect
could be predicted, B was calculated with the predicted effect
size used as the standard deviation of a half normal distribu-
tion, notated as BH(0,SD). For effects for which there is no
predicted direction, a normal distribution was used, with an
SD also equal to the predicted effect size, notated as BN(0,SD)
(see Dienes, 2014).
In the analyses of response times and volitional choices, we
used prior effect sizes from Parkinson and Haggard (2014),
and we predicted that compared to neutral faces, happy faces
would produce response approach, speeding response times
and increasing volitional choice to act, whereas we predicted
fearful faces would produce response withdrawal, resulting in
the opposite effects, and Bayes factors for these effects were
calculated using half normal distributions in the appropriate
directions. Because of the ambiguous effects of angry faces,
we made no prediction regarding the direction of effects of
response times and intentional choice, and thus Bs were cal-
culated using a normal distribution.
When analysing response times for Reactive and
Intentional Go trials, median response times were calculated
for each participant, for each emotional prime, and analysed
using a 2 × 4 repeated-measures ANOVA. Bs for response
times were computed using a predicted effect size of 30 ms,
a rounded average of effects on response times of facilitatory
and inhibitory arrow primes as compared to neutral arrow
primes in Parkinson and Haggard (2014). When analysing
volitional choices, Intentional Go rates were calculated as
the percentage of Intentional trials in which participants chose
to execute rather than withhold the button-press response fol-
lowing a given emotional prime. Bs for Intentional Go rates
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were computed using a predicted effect size of 5 %, again
taken from Parkinson and Haggard (2014).
D-prime (d’) values for the detection and/or discrimination
tasks were calculated for each participant, as an objective
measure of performance. These values were tested against a
value of zero (chance detection/discrimination performance)
using a t test, and Bayes factors were also calculated. Whilst
we acknowledge the recent position taken by Peters and Lau
(2015) that all above-chance objective performance (i.e., any
d’ above zero) is accompanied by at least some degree of
subjective awareness, we still sought a reasonable prior objec-
tive d’ value to calculate B in order to provide evidence for
participants being unaware (or at least minimally aware) of
face primes as opposed to being fully aware of them.
Szczepanowski and Pessoa (2007) compared objective and
subjective (confidence rating) measures of face detection and
discrimination. From this study we estimated that an objective
d’ of 0.3 tends to correspond to the cusp of subjective visibil-
ity, and this value was used to calculate half-normal Bs for
detection/discrimination tasks.
Results
False alarm rates, miss rates, and Intentional Go rates
Mean false alarm rate (Reactive NoGo trials in which partic-
ipants erroneously made a response) was 5.94 % (SD = 5.99).
Mean miss rate (Reactive Go trials in which participants erro-
neously failed to respond) was 1.20 % (SD = 1.71).
Disregarding emotional face priming, mean overall rate of
choosing Intentional Go responses in Choice trials was
62.86 % (SD = 11.38).
Detection task
There was evidence that detection performance was no better
than chance (mean d’ = -0.06, SD = 0.20), t(11) = -1.09, p =
.300, BH(0,0.3) = 0.10), suggesting that participants were un-
able to consciously detect the presence of face primes, at least
according to the level of objective performance that could be
expected if the subjective threshold had possibly been
exceeded (Szczepanowski & Pessoa, 2007). Again we ac-
knowledge the possibility that participants may have some
minimal subjective awareness of some faces (Peters & Lau,
2015), but we argue that the evidence is strongly in favour of
them being mostly unaware.
Response times
Group means of response times are shown for Reactive Go
(see Fig. 2a) and Intentional Go (Fig. 2b) trials. There was
evidence for a main effect of response source (Reactive vs.
Intentional), F(1, 11) = 28, p < .001, η2 = .72, BH(0,30) =
23,332, with response times for Intentional Go trials
(409 ms, SD = 43) overall slower than those for Reactive Go
trials (349 ms, SD = 30). This indicates a response time cost in
making a volitional decision to act, which replicates previous
findings (Parkinson & Haggard, 2014, 2015). However, there
was no significant main effect of emotional prime, F(3, 33) =
0.41, p = .748, η2 = 0.04, and no significant interaction, F(3,
33) = 0.50, p = .673, η2 = .04.
The simple effects of emotional faces on response times are
presented in Table 1. For Reactive Go responses, there was
evidence that the emotional faces (happy, fearful, angry) had
no effects on response times as compared to neutral faces. For
Intentional Go responses, there was no evidence one way or
the other for effects of emotional faces on response times.
Intentional Go rates
There was a significant main effect of emotional primes on
Intentional Go rates, F(3, 33) = 4.12, p = .014, η2 = 0.27 (see
Fig. 3). Crucially, there was evidence for a difference between
angry and neutral primes. t(11) = 3.48, p = .005, Cohen’s dz =
1.01, mean difference = 6.08 %, SEM = 1.71, BN(0,5) = 73.23,
such that Intentional Go rates following angry primes were on
average 6.1 % lower than those following neutral primes.
These results indicate that when participants are subliminally
primed with angry emotional faces and then given a choice
about whether or not to execute a prepared action, they are
more likely to choose to withhold responses compared to sit-
uations when they are primed with neutral emotional
expressions.
There was evidence for no effect of happy faces on
Intentional Go rates, t(11) = 0.79 p = .445, Cohen’s dz =
0.23, mean difference = 1.78 %, SEM = 2.24, BH(0,5) = 0.25.
There was alsomoderate evidence for no effect of fearful faces
on Intentional Go rates, t(11) = 0.14, p = .889, Cohen’s dz =
0.04, mean difference = 0.23 %, SEM = 1.60, BH(0,5) = 0.34.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 demonstrated that subliminal angry faces could
influence individuals’ volitional decisions, making themmore
likely to intentionally withhold rather than execute a prepared
action. The importance of this finding lies in the observation
that emotional cues that are task-irrelevant yet socially
important can influence conscious decision making, even
when they are nonconsciously perceived. This suggests that
sometimes our conscious behaviour can be unconsciously af-
fected by environmental influences relevant to social interac-
tions with human conspecifics.
Experiment 2 investigated whether the findings of
Experiment 1 can be replicated when the emotional faces are
presented supraliminally. Whilst in some paradigms of
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response priming, increasing subjective awareness of a prime
increases its effect size (Atas, Vermeiren, & Cleeremans,
2013), paradigms involving socially salient primes have sug-
gested that conscious awareness of a prime can effectively
eliminate priming effects (e.g., Sherman et al., 2009).
Participants
Twelve participants, who were recruited from the University
of Sussex School of Psychology undergraduate participant
pool and volunteered in return for course credits, took part
in Experiment 2. None of the participants had taken part in
Experiments 1 or 3. Nine were female, and the mean age was
21.92 years (SD = 5.85). The University of Sussex ethics
committee approved the experimental procedures.
Stimuli and procedure
Experiment 2 used the same procedure and stimuli as in
Experiment 1, except that the prime faces were presented for
100 ms rather than 20 ms, which rendered them clearly visible
and their emotions discriminable. Following the main
experiment, participants were debriefed, and a detection task
(face present/absent) was performed as in Experiment 1, but
again with the faces presented for 100 ms. In addition to this,
two discrimination tasks were performed using the stimuli
from the experiment, in order to ascertain that participants
could consciously parse the emotions of the faces: The first
asked participants to discriminate between angry and neutral
faces, the second between happy and fearful faces.
Results
False alarm rates, miss rates, and Intentional Go rates
Mean false alarm rate was 4.76% (SD = 3.89). Meanmiss rate
was 1.78 % (SD = 1.95). Disregarding emotional face prim-
ing, mean overall rate of choosing Intentional Go responses in
Choice trials was 57.86 % (SD = 8.78).
Detection and discrimination tasks
As expected, both the detection and discrimination tasks were
easy, with participants often performing at ceiling. In these
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Fig. 2 Mean group response times in Experiment 1 for (a) Reactive Go trials and (b) Intentional Go trials. Error bars showwithin-subjects standard error
following Cousineau–Morey corrections (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008; O’Brien & Cousineau, 2015). No statistically significant effects were found.
Table 1 Simple effects of response times in Experiment 1, showing t test and Bayes factor results
Emotional face effect Mean difference (ms) SEM t p Cohen’s dz Bayes factor
Reactive Go responses
Neutral-happy -1.10 3.03 -0.36 0.724 -0.11 BH(0,30) =0.08
Neutral-fearful 1.25 3.13 0.40 0.696 0.12 BH(0,30) =0.08
Neutral-angry 0.21 3.48 0.06 0.953 0.02 BN(0,30) =0.12
Intentional Go responses
Neutral-happy 1.73 14.40 0.12 0.906 0.04 BH(0,30) =0.48
Neutral-fearful -13.60 16.02 -0.85 0.414 -0.25 BH(0,30) =0.97
Neutral-angry -1.89 14.64 -0.13 0.900 -0.04 BN(0,30) =0.44
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cases, hit rate was set to 99 % (and false alarm rate to 1 %) to
avoid infinite d’ values. There was strong evidence that par-
ticipants could easily detect the presence or absence of faces
(mean d’ = 4.39, SD = 0.19), t(11) = 78.52, p < .001, BH(0,0.3) =
∞, and discriminate between emotions (angry/neutral: mean d’
= 3.91, SD = 0.70), t(11) = 19.39, p < .001, BH(0,0.3) > 10
10;
(happy/fearful: mean d’ = 4.14, SD = 0.66), t(11) = 21.97, p <
.001, BH(0,0.3) > 10
10.
Response times
Response times were analysed as in Experiment 1. There was
a significant main effect of response source (Reactive vs.
Intentional), F(1, 11) = 12.96, p = .004, η2 = 0.54, BH(0,30) =
142, with Intentional Go response times (405 ms, SD = 56.78)
slower than those for Reactive Go trials (353 ms, SD = 33.43),
replicating the findings from Experiment 1. There was no
significant main effect of emotional prime, F(3, 33) = 1.04,
p = .389, η2 = 0.09, nor a significant interaction, F(3, 33) =
0.58, p = .604, η2 = 0.05.
The simple effects of emotional faces on response times are
presented in Table 2. There was evidence for no effect of
fearful and angry faces on both Reactive and Intentional re-
sponse times, and no evidence either way for the effects of
happy faces.
Intentional Go rates
Intentional Go rates were analysed as in Experiment 1. There
was no significant main effect of emotional primes on
Intentional Go rates, F(3, 33) = 1.29, p = .294, η2 = 0.11.
There was evidence for no effect of happy faces on
Intentional Go rate, t(11) = 1.83, p = .094, Cohen’s dz =
0.53, mean difference = 4.41 %, SEM = 2.41, BH(0,5) = 0.17,
with any difference here in the opposite direction to that pre-
dicted. There was no evidence one way or the other for the
effects of fearful primes, t(11) = 1.17, p = .268, Cohen’s dz =
0.34, mean difference = 3.03 %, SEM = 2.60, BH(0,5) = 1.34.
For angry primes there was moderate evidence for no effect,
t(11) = 0.232, p = .821, Cohen’s dz = 0.07, mean difference =
0.43 %, SEM = 1.83, BN(0,5) = 0.41.
Summary
The results from Experiment 1 provided evidence that sublim-
inally presented angry faces reduce Intentional Go rates. There
was no evidence that subliminal happy or fearful faces had
such an effect. It is the effect of the subliminal angry faces we
consider most critical result: Plausibly, they act like a noncon-
scious threat or withdrawal cue which can affect volitional,
conscious decisions about whether to execute or intentionally
inhibit an action. Conversely, in Experiment 2, there was mod-
erate evidence that supraliminally presented emotional faces
had no effects on Intentional Go rates (directly compare the
scale of evidence for this effect in Experiment 1, BN(0,5) =
73.23, with that in Experiment 2, BN(0,5) = 0.41). Taken to-
gether, our findings indicate that in our paradigm the inhibi-
tory effects of angry faces on conscious decisions are only
present when one is not consciously aware of the angry faces.
One possible explanation for this effect is that consciously
perceived faces can be discounted as task irrelevant in virtue
of a general functional flexibility afforded to consciously per-
ceived stimuli (see also Discussion).
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 found that subliminally (but not
supraliminally) presented angry faces can alter volition deci-
sions to withhold a prepotent response. In Experiment 3, we
examined the neural underpinnings of these effects of sublim-
inal angry faces using EEG. To increase statistical power, we
used only neutral and angry faces in this experiment. There
were two a priori EEG effects of interest, which will be ex-
plained in detail below: First, we aimed tomeasure differences
in the event-related potential (ERP) known as the N2 compo-
nent. Second, we analysed differences in EEG frequency pow-
er over the course of a trial between different conditions, spe-
cifically looking at power changes in the theta band (4–7 Hz)
over frontal-midline areas of the head.
N2 ERP component
Previous EEG studies of Go/NoGo tasks have mainly focused
on the negative going ERP component known as N2, which is
most prominent when measured at frontal-central electrodes,



























Choice Trials Action Rate
Fig. 3 Intentional Choice rate (mean rate at which participants chose to
perform an action in Choice trials) in Experiment 1, according to the
emotional face prime. Error bars show within-subjects standard error
following Cousineau–Morey corrections. Stars indicate results of t test
comparison. **p <.01. No stars indicates nonsignificant comparison
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and peaks around 150–250 ms following the onset of the Go/
NoGo target stimulus (Pfefferbaum et al., 1985). In general,
larger (more negative) N2 components are observed following
NoGo as compared to Go trials (Pfefferbaum et al., 1985),
possibly reflecting effortful motor inhibition of the prepotent
Go response (Bokura, Yamaguchi, & Kobayashi, 2001;
Eimer, 1993; Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999;
Lavric, Pizzagalli, & Forstmeier, 2004; Pfefferbaum et al.,
1985; van Gaal et al., 2011).
Howmight the N2 component behave in the Intentional Go
trials in the present paradigm? In a previous study using a
basic Go/NoGo/Choose paradigm, but without the presenta-
tion of any form of subliminal primes, we found that peak N2
amplitude, in both Intentional Go and Intentional NoGo trials,
was as large as that for a Reactive NoGo trial, and higher than
in Reactive Go trials (Parkinson & Haggard, 2015). The pres-
ence of a strong N2 for Intentional trials suggests that the
process of making a volitional decision to execute or withhold
an action can entail initial inhibition of the prepotent Reactive
response to allow for the Intentional decision. Therefore, in
the current study we aimed to investigate whether subliminal
angry faces, already shown to affect Intentional Go rates
behaviourally (see Experiment 1), also affect the N2 ERP
component. That is, does an angry subliminal face modulate
the N2 component and can this account for its influence on
Intentional Go rates?
Frontal-midline theta band power
Recent investigations of cognitive control and inhibition have
also focused on ongoing changes in the oscillatory EEG, as
measured by using time-frequency analysis. Here, we focus
on the theta band (4–7 Hz) occurring over frontal-midline
scalp areas. This frontal-midline theta (FM-θ) has been asso-
ciated with a variety of higher-level cognitive functions in-
cluding novelty detection, working memory and top-down
control (see Cavanagh & Frank, 2014, for a review). It may
even be that common ERP components that are observed in
EEG data recorded during these tasks reflect underlying
changes in FM-θ synchronicity (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014).
Previous studies have found increases in FM-θ power
evoked by NoGo stimuli in a standard Go/NoGo paradigm
(Cavanagh, Zambrano-Vazquez, & Allen, 2012; Kirmizi-
Alsan et al., 2006). These increases have been interpreted as
reflecting internal response-conflict between a prepotent Go
responses and the required withholding of that response.
Based on this interpretation, we hypothesized that FM-θ will
be higher for Reactive NoGo compared to Reactive Go trials
(cf. Kirmizi-Alsan et al., 2006), and that intentional trials (both
Go and NoGo) will also lead to increased FM-θ, due to the
involvement of response conflict, as mentioned above. Based
on the results of Experiment 1, we further hypothesized that
subliminal angry primes will lead to reduced FM-θ, as com-
pared to neutral primes, reflecting reduced response conflict.
Participants
Nineteen participants took part in Experiment 3, recruited
from the University of Sussex School of Psychology under-
graduate participant pool. Fifteen participants were paid £20
to take part, whilst four took part for course credits at their
own request. None of these participants had taken part in
Experiments 1 or 2. Three participants’ data had to be rejected
because of errors (recording errors or irrecoverably noisy EEG
data). Of the remaining 16 participants, 10 were female and
the mean age was 19.69 years (SD = 1.58).
Stimuli and procedure
The experimental paradigm was the same as Experiment 1,
except that only neutral and angry face primes were presented.
The experiment consisted of 720 trials, 360 of each emotional
face prime. Of each set of 360, 180 were Reactive Go trials, 60
were Reactive NoGo, and 120 were Intentional Go trials. EEG
was recorded at a sampling rate of 2048Hz using a 64-channel
Refa 8 amplifier and a 64-channel Waveguard EEG cap (both
from ANT Neuro, Enschede, The Netherlands). External
Table 2 Simple effects of response times in Experiment 2, showing t test and Bayes factor results
Emotional face effect Mean difference (ms) SEM t p Cohen’s dz Bayes factor
Reactive Go responses
Neutral-happy 3.39 1.68 2.02 0.069 0.58 BH(0,30) =0.83
Neutral-fearful 0.08 2.31 0.04 0.972 0.01 BH(0,30) =0.08
Neutral-angry 0.35 1.93 0.18 0.859 0.05 BN(0,30) =0.07
Intentional Go responses
Neutral-happy 4.17 6.97 0.60 0.562 0.17 BH(0,30) =0.39
Neutral-fearful 8.52 4.93 1.73 0.112 0.50 BH(0,30) =0.06
Neutral-angry -1.17 8.02 -0.15 0.887 -0.04 BN(0,30) =0.26
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bipolar electrodes were attached above and below the left eye
to obtain vertical electrooculogram (EOG), and on the left and
right canthi to take horizontal EOG. The experiment was per-
formed in a shielded Faraday cage.
Stimulus timings were identical to those in Experiment 1,
with the exception of an additional 1,000-ms period following
the response period during which the word BLINK was pre-
sented at the centre of the screen. Participants were given the
same instructions as in Experiment 1, with the addition that
they were instructed to not deviate their eyes from the fixation
point and to refrain from blinking for the whole duration of the
trial. They were asked to only blink during the period denoted
by the word BLINK appearing on the screen. The purpose of
this was to reduce artefacts produced by eye blinks and move-
ments distorting trial-relevant EEG signals.
There was a similar debrief procedure as in Experiment 1 in
which participants were informed of the presence of the
primes. Again, they were asked to complete both a 96-trial
prime detection task and a 96-trial prime discrimination task
(in which face primes were always present, and participants
had to make un-speeded Bangry/neutral^ judgements).
Results
False alarm rates, miss rates, and Intentional Go rates
Mean false alarm rate was 5.46 % (SD = 6.1). Mean miss rate
was 2.90 % (SD = 2.59). Disregarding emotional face prim-
ing, mean overall rate of Intentional Go trials was 59.06 %
(SD = 8.30).
Prime detection and discrimination tasks
Detection and discrimination results were analysed as in
Experiment 1. There was no evidence in either direction about
whether prime detection performance was above chance
(mean d’ = 0.08, SD = 0.19), t(15) = 1.72, p = .107, BH(0,0.3)
= 1.21, so we cannot categorically state that participants were
not able to detect the presence or absence of face primes, but
the low magnitude of d’ suggests that it was nevertheless dif-
ficult to do so. There was evidence that performance at the
discrimination taskwas at chance (mean d’ = 0.03, SD = 0.17),
t(15) = 0.62, p = .548, BH(0,0.3) = 0.25. Thus participants could
not discriminate the emotion of the faces.
Response times
Response times were analysed as in Experiment 1. There was
evidence for a main effect of response source (Reactive vs.
Intentional), F(1, 15) = 8.98, p = .009, η2 = 0.37, mean dif-
ference = 32.39 ms, SEM = 10.58, BH(0,30) = 42.83, with
Intentional Go response times (419 ms, SD = 48.24) slower
than those for Reactive Go trials (387 ms, SD = 32.52), repli-
cating the findings from Experiment 1.
There was evidence for no main effect of emotional prime
on response times, F(1, 15) = 1.07, p = .316, η2 = 0.07, mean
difference = 3.41 ms, SEM = 3.29, BN(0,30) = 0.06, and evi-
dence for no interaction between emotional prime and re-
sponse source, F(1, 16) = 0.066, p = .801, η2 < .01, interaction
difference = 1.20 ms, SEM = 4.80, BN(0,30) = 0.16..
There was evidence for no simple effects of angry faces on
both Reactive and Intentional response times as compared to
neutral faces, Reactive Go (mean difference = 2.8 ms, SEM =
2.43), t(15) = 1.15, p = .269, Cohen’s dz = 0.29, BN(0,30) =
0.16; Intentional Go (mean difference = 4.03 ms, SEM =
5.22), t(15) = 0.77, p = .453, Cohen’s dz = 0.19, BN(0,30) =
0.23.
Intentional Go rates
Intentional Go rates were analysed as in Experiment 1. There
was evidence for a main effect of angry primes on Intentional
Go rates, t(15) = 2.67, p = .018, Cohen’s dz = 0.67, BN(0,5) =
7.37, such that Intentional Go rates following angry primes
were on average 3.78 % lower than those following neutral
primes, again replicating the findings from Experiment 1.
EEG preprocessing
EEG data was preprocessed using the FieldTrip software tool-
box for MATLAB (Oostenveld, Fries, Maris, & Schoffelen,
2011). Data were epoched according to trials by time locking
to the onset of the target stimulus. To reject data potentially
affected by eye movement or blink artefacts, signals from
vertical EOG electrodes were filtered using a two-pass finite
impulse response (FIR) band-pass filter between 1 and 15 Hz,
and then examined for signals that exceeded a ±100 μV
threshold. EOG signals exceeding this threshold were marked
as potential ocular artefacts, and any trials during which such
artefacts occurred between -100 and 600 ms relative to target
onset were excluded from further analysis.
For ERP/amplitude analysis, EEG data were filtered using
a two-pass FIR band-pass filter between 0.1 and 40 Hz
(following Lavric et al., 2004), with an additional discrete
Fourier transform filter to remove electrical line noise (at 50,
100, and 150 Hz). Two-pass filtering was used to correct for
the phase-shifting effects of filters, resulting in zero-phase
filtering. Data were rereferenced to linked mastoids and
base-lined over the period -200 to -100 ms relative to target
onset. This period was chosen to avoid the removal of EEG
activity evoked by the prime stimuli. The data were then
resampled to 256 Hz.
For time-frequency analysis, EEG data were not subject to
band-pass filtering with the exception of the DFT filter used to
remove electrical line noise and the use of the FieldTrip
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detrending function to remove linear trends from the data.
Data were again rereferenced to linked mastoids and
resampled to 256 Hz. For each participant, time-frequency
power spectra were extracted from each individual trial of
EEG data using a multitaper wavelet convolution method im-
plemented in FieldTrip. Data were analysed from -1,000 to
700 ms relative to target onset, in 10-ms steps. Frequencies
between 1 and 50 Hz were analysed in 0.5-Hz steps. A
Hanning taper was used, and the time length of the sliding
window was set to span four cycles of the analysed frequency.
After time-frequency analysis was complete, total power for
each condition for each participant was computed by averag-
ing power spectra across the appropriate trials. The length of
each epoch was reduced to span -100 to +700 ms relative to
target onset.
ERP results
For each participant, trial EEG data were averaged according
to response source (Reactive vs. Intentional), response (Go vs.
NoGo), and emotional prime (neutral vs. angry). Given our a
priori focus on the N2 component, the ERP analysis was con-
ducted on averaged EEG signals at five midline electrodes
covering frontal-central to slightly behind vertex scalp areas
(Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz; Pfefferbaum et al., 1985). Within each
participant, the N2 component was identified separately with-
in each condition of the 5 × 2 × 2 × 2 design by identifying the
largest magnitude negative peak in the period between 50 and
300ms relative to target onset. Peak latency for each condition
was defined as the time point of this peak relative to target
onset. Peak amplitude was defined as the amplitude (in μV) of
this peak. Note that because the N2 is defined as a negative
going component, we consistently use terms regarding the
Bmagnitude^ of the N2 component as describing whether it
is more or less negative in potential (more or less negative
μV).
Peak amplitudes and latencies were analysed using a 5 × 2
× 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA. Bayes factors for simple
effects were calculated based on ERP effects found in a pre-
vious experiment that replicated the arrow priming experiment
of Parkinson and Haggard (2014) using EEG (Parkinson &
Haggard, 2015). In the latter experiment, significant peak am-
plitude differences were in the order of 4 μV, and those of
peak latencies 40 ms. Because directions of effects could not
be predicted in all cases, Bs were conducted using a normal
distribution.
Peak amplitudes Figure 4 shows grand average ERPs at rep-
resentative frontal-central electrode FCz, showing conditions
Reactive/Intention × Go/NoGo. For peak amplitudes, there
was evidence for no main effect of emotional prime (neutral
vs. angry), F(1, 15) = 0.10, p = .762, η2 = 0.01, mean differ-
ence = 0.10 μV, SEM = 0.22, BN(0,4) = 0.08. There was
evidence for a main effect of response (Go vs. NoGo), F(1,
15) = 9.37, p = .008, η2 = 0.38, BN(0,4) = 8.07, such that peak
amplitudes for NoGo responses (M = -11.67, SD = 4.24) were
larger than those for Go responses (M = -10.73, SD = 4.31,
mean difference = -0.94 μV, SEM = 0.22). There was no
evidence either way for a main effect of Response source
(Reactive vs. Intentional), F(1, 15) = 6.11, p = .026, η2 =
0.29, BN(0,4) = 1.86. However there was a significant main
effect of electrode, F(4, 60) = 30.14, p < .001, η2 = 0.67, such
that N2 magnitude was overall greater at frontal-central elec-
trodes (Fz, FCz, Cz) than at more posterior sites (CPz, Pz).
Moreover, there was a significant interaction between the fac-
tors of electrode and response source, F(4, 60) = 4.57, p =
.017, η2 = 0.23. At frontal-central electrodes, there was evi-
dence that intentional trials elicited larger N2 components than
did reactive trials, whereas there was no evidence for this
effect at more posterior sites (see Supplementary Table 1 for
complete ANOVA results for peak amplitudes). To highlight,
for N2 ERP amplitudes, there were no effects of emotional
face prime.
Peak latencies For peak latencies, there was no significant
main effect of electrode, F(4, 60) = 0.19, p = .709, η2 =
0.01. There was evidence for no main effects of either emo-
tion, F(1, 15) = 0.13, p = .296, η2 = 0.01, mean difference =
0.96 ms, SEM = 2.73, BN(0,40) = 0.07, or response (Go vs.
NoGo), F(1, 15) = 0.08, p = .777, η2 = 0.01, mean difference
= -0.60 ms, SEM = 2.07, BN(0,40) = 0.05. The main effect of
Response source (Reactive vs. intentional) on peak latencies
was significant, F(1, 15) = 7.06, p = .018, η2 = 0.32, mean
difference = -7.87 ms, SEM = 2.96, BN(0,4) = 2.47, such that
N2 peaked earlier in Intentional compared to Reactive trials,
but the evidence did not distinguish between the null and
alternative hypotheses. No interactions were significant (see
Supplementary Table 2 for complete ANOVA results for peak
latencies).
ERP summary
The results show that overall N2 magnitude was larger at
frontal-central electrode sites as compared to more posterior
areas, which was to be expected (Pfefferbaum et al., 1985).
Importantly, N2 magnitudes were larger for NoGo trials than
Go trials, suggesting that overall, the process of selecting a
NoGo response rather than a Go response requires effortful
response inhibition. At frontal-central sites, N2 magnitude
was also larger—and somewhat earlier—for Intentional com-
pared to Reactive trials, indicating that making a volitional
decision about one’s response, as opposed to reacting to an
external cue, entails more motor inhibition and/or response
conflict overall. Crucially, N2magnitudes were not modulated
by subliminal emotional primes (angry vs. neutral faces).
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Frontal-midline theta power analysis
For each participant and each condition, mean power spectra
were computed for the frequency band of interest, the theta
band (4–7 Hz), over the period from target onset until 500 ms
after target onset, over frontal-midline electrodes (Cz and
FCz). These values were analysed using a 2 (Reactive vs.
Intentional) × 2 (Go vs. NoGo) × 2 (Neutral vs. Angry emo-
tional prime) repeated-measures ANOVA (see Supplementary
Table 3 for full ANOVA results). Simple effects were tested
with t tests, and Bayes factors were computed using a
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
2 μV2, the latter value estimated from example theta changes
seen in Cavanagh and Frank's (2014) review of cognitive con-
trol effects of theta (note that it was not possible to predict
effects of priming on theta power, so this estimate may be
conservative).
We found evidence for two 2-way interactions. The first
was between Response Source and Response, F(1, 15) = 8.70,
p = .010, η2 = 0.37, interaction difference = 2.40 μV2, SEM =
0.82, BN(0,2) = 14.80, shown in Fig. 5. Simple tests reveal that
for Reactive responses, FM-θ was significantly larger for
Reactive NoGo responses (M = 4.46 μV2, SD = 3.99) com-
pared to Reactive Go responses (M = 2.74 μV2, SD = 2.74;
mean difference = 1.72 μV2, SEM = 0.49), t(15) = 3.46, p =
.004, Cohen’s dz = 0.87, BN(0,2) = 69. Compared to Reactive
Go trials, FM-θ power was also larger for both Intentional Go
(M = 4.77 μV2, SD = 3.67, mean difference = 2.03 μV2, SEM
= 0.47), t(15) = 4.30, p = .001, Cohen’s dz = 1.08, BN(0,2) =
1367.7, and Intentional NoGo (M = 4.06 μV2, SD = 2.99,
mean difference = 1.32 μV2, SEM = 0.40), t(15) = 3.31, p =
.005, Cohen’s dz = 0.83, BN(0,2) = 43.1.
Comparing mean FM-θ for Intentional Go with that for
Intentional NoGo trials, there was no evidence one way or
the other for an effect (mean difference = 0.71 μV2, SEM =
0.40), t(15) = 1.76, p = .099, Cohen’s dz = 0.44, BN(0,2) = 1.10.
There was also no evidence one way or the other for differ-
ences in FM-θ for Reactive NoGo trials compared to either
Intentional Go (mean difference = 0.31 μV2, SEM = 0.47),
t(15) = 0.66, p = 0.517, Cohen’s dz = 0.76, BN(0,2) = 0.36, or
Intentional NoGo trials (mean difference = 0.40 μV2, SEM =
0.65), t(15) = 0.62, p = .545, Cohen’s dz = 0.16, BN(0,2) = 0.47.
Summarizing this first interaction, mean FM-θ power is
significantly decreased for reactive Go trials compared to re-
active NoGo and both Intentional Go and NoGo trials. These
results show, first, that effortful withholding of a prepotent
response in Reactive NoGo trials involves engaging cognitive
control mechanisms, as indexed by increased FM-θ for
Reactive NoGo trials compared to Reactive Go trials, in line
with previous research (Kirmizi-Alsan et al., 2006).
Furthermore, increased FM-θ for Intentional trials compared
to reactive Go trials suggests that making a volitional choice




































































Fig. 4 Grand average ERP waveforms from representative frontal-
central channels Fz, FCz, and Cz, showing the Reactive/Intentional ×
Go/NoGo conditions, with the N2 component labelled. The solid vertical
line at time 0 ms indicates the onset of the target and the dashed line the
onset of the subliminal face prime
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between the two responses, engages cognitive control mech-
anisms, irrespective of the outcome. This implies, in the cur-
rent paradigm, FM-θ does not only indicate exogenously elic-
ited control, but may also be a neural signature of endogenous-
ly generated, volitional decisions about whether to execute or
withhold an prepotent action, without signifying the outcome
of that decision.
The second two-way interaction was between Response
Source and Emotional Prime, F(1, 15) = 11.94, p = .004, η2
= 0.44, interaction difference = 1.42 μV2, SEM = 0.41, BN(0,2)
= 63.5, illustrated in Fig. 6. Figure 7 shows the timeline of
grand-average FM-θ differences (angry primes – neutral
primes) over the course of a trial. Examining simple effects,
there was evidence that angry primes had no effect on FM-θ in
Reactive trials (mean difference = -0.38 μV2, SEM = 0.38),
t(15) = -0.98, p = .341, Cohen’s dz = 0.25, BN(0,2) = 0.30.
Crucially, there was an effect of angry primes on FM-θ in
Intentional trials (mean difference = 1.04 μV2, SEM = 0.40),
t(15) = 2.63, p = .019, Cohen’s dz = 0.65, BN(0,2) = 5.42, such
that mean FM-θ power for Angry primes (M = 3.89μV2, SD =
3.15) was lower than that for Neutral primes (M = 4.93 μV2,
SD = 3.53). This suggests that subliminal angry faces reduce
involvement of cognitive control mechanisms during
Intentional trials, but not during Reactive trials, in line with
the hypothesis that angry primes may influence Intentional
decisions by allowing automatically inducing a withdrawal
response. It was possible that the different ratio of
Intentional Go to NoGo trials in response to different emo-
tional faces could have influenced the measurements of theta
power in response to different emotional faces, which could
have mediated the result described here. In order to provide
evidence against this, we conducted a post hoc two-way
ANOVA on FM-θ power for only Intentional trials, with the
factors Response (Intentional Go vs. Intentional NoGo) and
Emotion (neutral vs. angry). There was a main effect of emo-
tion, as expected, F(1, 15) = 6.92, p = .019, but no significant
main effect of response, F(1, 15) = 3.09, p = .099, and no
significant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 15) =
1.94, p = .184. This suggests that within the condition of
intentional trials, the differences in theta power were driven
by the effects of emotional face primes.
Discussion
Over the course of three experiments, we found that sublimi-
nally presented emotional angry faces influence intentional
decisions about whether to execute or inhibit a prepotent mo-
tor action, whereas consciously perceived angry faces do not.
This extends previous work showing subliminal priming of
Intentional Go (Parkinson & Haggard, 2014). Importantly, we
provide novel evidence for a nonconscious mechanism
influencing conscious decisions via the presentation of eco-
logically valid, socially salient emotional stimuli. Specifically,
subliminal perception of an angry (but not neutral) face led to
increased voluntary inhibition of a prepotent motor response.
This finding suggests that even subliminal socially salient
stimuli can engage mechanisms driving conscious
(volitional) self-control. A possible explanation for this effect
is that the subliminal perception of anger acts as a noncon-
scious cue to withdraw, rendering the subsequent volition de-
cision to respond, or to withhold response, less voluntary.
Such a mechanism would have adaptive value, whereby even




























Fig. 6 Group mean FM-θ power in the Response Source × Emotional
Prime interaction. Error bars show within-subjects standard error follow-
ing Cousineau–Morey corrections. Stars indicate results of t test compar-




























Fig. 5 Group mean FM-θ power in the Response × Response Source
interaction. Error bars show within-subjects standard error following
Cousineau–Morey corrections. Stars indicate results of t test comparison.
**p < .01. No stars indicates nonsignificant comparison
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triggers a conscious process of withholding a prepotent re-
sponse in order to assess the situation, to prevent any trans-
gressive behaviour, or to avoid any further hostile, aggressive
repercussions (Blair, 2003; Blair et al., 1999).
Previous research has implicated frontal-midline theta ac-
tivity in exogenously cued decision making and conflict mon-
itoring (Cavanagh et al., 2012; Kirmizi-Alsan et al., 2006),
and we replicate these results, showing that FM-θ is increased
for Reactive NoGo trials—when one is required exogenously
to withhold a prepotent response—as compared to Reactive
Go trials. Our data go further in showing that FM-θ may also
act as a neural signature of endogenously generated, con-
scious (but rapid) decisions about whether to execute or with-
hold a prepotent action: FM-θ is increased for both Intentional
Go and NoGo decisions (relative to Reactive Go responses).
This suggests that increases in FM-θ accompany Intentional
choices, but do not predict the outcome of that choice.
Crucially, our study has also shown that when making a
spontaneous volitional decision to act or inhibit an action,
FM-θ activity is modulated by subliminally presented emo-
tional stimuli, such that a (subliminal) angry face leads to
reduced FM-θ. We propose that this reflects the angry primes’
behavioural effect of predisposing an individual to withhold
an action. Simply, if subliminally primed to withhold the ac-
tion with an angry face and then given a volitional choice,
there are reduced demands on cognitive control processes in-
volved in making that spontaneous decision.
Several of our findings require further interpretation. First,
neither experiment found significant effects of any emotional
face prime on Reactive or Intentional Go response times (al-
though the null could not be supported in all cases). This con-
trasts with previous studies (Parkinson & Haggard, 2014), in
which response-time effects accompanied changes in volitional
choice rates: Facilitatory primes both increased choice to act
and speeded Reactive and Intentional Go responses, whereas
inhibitory primes reduced choice to act and slowed responses.
The disparity in results is likely due to the differences in
priming mechanisms utilised in these studies. Parkinson and
Haggard (2014) used simple arrow stimuli as targets and sub-
liminal primes, suggesting that priming of response rates and
response times (in Intentional trials) was due to simple prime-
target congruency biasing subsequent motor responses (e.g.,
Eimer & Schlaghecken, 2003). This explanation can be ruled
out by design in the current study, because the emotional face
primes are not visually congruent with targets. Rather, we sug-
gest that subliminal emotional faces affect intentional responses
because they are salient social cues, and they exert priming
effects by modulating higher-level decision-making processes
(reflected by response rates but not times), not lower-level mo-
tor-response biases (reflected by response rates and response
times). This is consistent with our finding that subliminal angry
faces do not modulate the N2 ERP component—which is often
associated with motor inhibition (Bokura et al., 2001; Eimer,
1993; Falkenstein et al., 1999; Pfefferbaum et al., 1985)—but
−100 :   0 ms   0 : 100 ms 100 : 200 ms
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Mean Frontal-Midline Theta (4-7 Hz) activity in Intentional Trials








Fig. 7 Differences in mean frontal-midline theta activity (angry primes
minus neutral primes) in intentional trials. Indicated times are relative to
target onset. Small unfilled circles indicate electrode positions. The
locations of channels FCz and Cz are highlighted as filled black circles.
Frontal-midline theta is clearly lower following angry compared to neu-
tral primes over the course of the trial. (Colour figure online)
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they do modulate FM-θ activity—associated with more cogni-
tive control processes (Cavanagh & Frank, 2014).
Second, the effects of angry faces upon intentional inhibition
were only apparent when the faces were subliminally but not
supraliminally presented. We suggest that this is because con-
sciously perceived (angry) faces can be explicitly recognised as
task irrelevant (given that the task is simply responding to
coloured circles). Thus, participants may simply consciously dis-
count the emotional faces. This may seem in conflict with pre-
vious research which has shown effects of emotional faces on
motor inhibition (Sagaspe et al., 2011; Schulz et al., 2007); how-
ever, in such studies participants had to consciously parse the
emotions of the face stimuli in order to perform the task—that is,
the emotional faces were task relevant.
Third, we address our finding that the behavioural effects of
subliminal emotional faces on intentional inhibition are, in the
current study, specific to angry faces. One possibility is that the
socially relevant information provided by an angry face is one
form of threat, and, moreover, a threat directed at you, and that
such stimuli have access to dedicated neural systems associated
with speed and automaticity of processing. Indeed, faces, espe-
cially certain emotional faces, are a privileged class of stimuli
associated with specialised neural systems (Lamy, Amunts, &
Bar-Haim, 2008; Schubö, Gendolla, Meinecke, & Abele,
2006). Moreover, environmental cues that are threatening to
the individual are afforded privileged and rapid processing
via dedicated perceptual systems (LeDoux, 2003), and this pro-
cessing is often automatic, bypassing cognitive processes
(Ohman&Mineka, 2001). Thus, threatening facial expressions
likely have a processing advantage in terms of speed and auto-
maticity (LeDoux, 2003). In line with this, when searching for
one class of emotional face in distractor arrays of others, detec-
tion of angry faces is substantially faster (Fox et al., 2000), even
when the search arrays are rendered difficult (but not sublimi-
nal) by backwards masking (Schubö et al., 2006). In addition,
subliminally presented angry faces generate skin conductance
responses compared to happy faces (Esteves, Dimberg, &
Öhman, 1994), indicating automatic and nonconscious threat
responses. Analogously, subliminal presentation of the word
ANGER can delay decision making (Garfinkel et al., 2015).
Fast subcortical neural pathways have been associated with
visual perception of threatening faces, implicating the amyg-
dala specifically in the subliminal perception of threat-
inducing faces, whether angry or fearful (Liddell et al.,
2005; Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1999; Ohman & Mineka,
2001; Whalen et al., 1998) with visual inputs arriving via
superior colliculus and pulvinar (Morris et al., 1999). This
system has been likened to a Bneural alarm^ (Liddell et al.,
2005) that acts as an automatic threat-detection system.
Interestingly this subcortical pathway is not active when the
face is consciously perceived (Morris et al., 1999).
We speculate that this mechanism is a possible candidate for
mediating the nonconscious processing of subliminal angry
faces as threat stimuli, leading to their effects upon intentional
inhibition. Further research using functional imaging targeted
at amygdala activity could explicitly test this account.
However, this interpretation is not without obvious limitations.
It treats angry faces as threat stimuli (directed at you) and sug-
gests it is this threatening quality that is processed by the neural
alarm system. This begs the question as to why fearful faces,
also considered threat stimuli, have no measured behavioural
effects in the current study. As Whalen and colleagues (1998)
point out, whilst angry faces might represent a direct personal
threat from a conspecific, the threat status of a fearful face can
be somewhat Bambiguous in that a fearful face signals the
presence of danger, but not its source^ (p. 42). One reason as
to why subliminal angry faces affect intentional inhibitions, but
fearful faces do not, might be exactly that distinction between
direct and contextual threat. Thus, much further research needs
to be done to tease apart the differences between the effects of
angry and fearful faces on volitional self-control. For example,
the effects of fearful faces on intentional inhibition might be
demonstrated by magnifying the threatening context they in-
duce. This might be done by swiftly presenting arrays of fearful
faces from which individuals unconsciously deduce a wide-
spread threatening situation (e.g., Haberman, Harp, &
Whitney, 2009). Conversely, the effects of angry faces may
be tempered by making the participants themselves no longer
the target of the anger, for example, by using faces whose eye
gaze or face orientation is directed away from the participants.
In summary, we have shown that volitional decisions about
whether to execute or inhibit an action can be altered by task-
irrelevant but socially meaningful subliminal cues, specifically,
threat-evoking angry faces. Both behavioural and neural data as-
sociate thiseffectwithhigh-levelcognitivecontrol rather than low-
level motor response bias. Overall, our findings indicate that con-
scious decision making can be manipulated by nonconsciously
perceived environmental cues, suggesting the existence of a
deep-seated, ecologically tuned threat-detection system that can
exert effects on volitional choices.
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